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Abstract 
The expansion of wind-generation in the United States poses significant challenges 
to policy-makers, particularly because wind’s intermittency and unpredictability can 
exacerbate problems of congestion on a transmission constrained grid.  Understanding 
these issues is necessary if optimal development of wind energy and transmission is to 
occur.  This paper applies a model that integrates the special concerns of electricity 
generation to empirically consider the challenges of developing wind resources in the 
Rocky Mountain region of the United States.  Given the lack the high frequency data needed 
to address the special problems of intermittency and congestion, our solution is to create a 
dispatch model of the region and to use simulations to generate the necessary data, then 
use this data to understand the development patterns that have occurred as wind 
resources have been developed. 
 Our results indicate that the price effects caused by changes in power output at 
intermittent sources are strongly dependent on supply conditions and the presence of 
market distortions caused by transmission constraints.  Peculiarities inherent in electric 
grid operation can cause system responses that are not always intuitive.  The distribution 
of the rents accruing to wind generation, particularly in unexpectedly windy periods are 
strongly dependent on the allocation of transmission rights when congestion occurs, which 
impacts potential returns to developing wind resources.  Incidents of congestion depend on 
the pace of development of wind and transmission capacity.  Not accounting for such 
distortions may cause new development to worsen market outcomes if mistaken estimates 
of benefits or costs lead to sub-optimal development of wind and transmission facilities.   
Introduction:   
The expansion of wind-generation in the United States poses significant challenges 
to policy-makers.  Of primary concern is how to incorporate wind and other renewable 
resources into the existing electricity-grid while maintaining power supply at low cost and 
high reliability.  On the supply side, adding generation with the unique characteristics of 
wind and solar power to the grid presents significant reliability and cost challenges.  
Electricity cannot easily be stored and the intermittency and unpredictability of these 
sources can make scheduling electricity in a reliable but efficient way difficult.  
Transmission capacity and network congestion also complicate these efforts (see Green 
and Vasilakos, 2008, DOE, 2009 and NREL, 2010 as examples).  On the demand side, 
electricity demand is unresponsive to cost change, lacking both the information to react to 
cost conditions and changes, and the short-run flexibility to meaningfully change an 
inelastic demand.  Given supply must always equal demand on an electricity system and 
that demand will not respond to changes in the availability of wind energy, sudden 
increases in the wind energy can cause significant economic changes as well as operational 
problems on the electricity-grid.  This paper attempts to illuminate these problems and 
their interrelationship with a simulated model of the Rocky Mountain area power grid.    
Among renewable sources, wind power poses the most serious challenge to 
electricity network planners and regulators due to the intermittency of the resource.  While 
backstop sources can be added to the grid for use when wind or other renewable resource 
availability is low, these large fixed capital investments are costly and their use as a 
backstop ensures lower capital return and higher system costs than when the same 
technologies are used as primary generators.  The determination of optimal diversity of 
generation sources, along with the spatial location of wind generating sources could reduce 
the potential intermittency of total generation, and reduce the fixed costs of backstop 
sources necessary to ensure system reliability.  Location of wind resources, however, often 
requires transmission capacity to deliver power to market when it is available.  Since 
intermittency exists, the coordination of wind generation to total demand on a fixed 
transmission system can be difficult and result in problems of congestion.  Congestion may 
occur due to demand spikes in one portion of the grid requiring delivery of additional 
power using the transmission network, or from unexpected increases in renewable 
generation, which strains the transmission system capacity to deliver this low-cost power 
to load.  When such congestion events occur, local rents can be created for generators in 
areas where congestion constrains deliverable energy as the value of energy on the 
downstream side of any constraint rises relative to uncongested conditions.  Significant 
rents may not only be created for generators within the areas affected by constrained 
delivery capacity, but they may also be created for the holders of transmission rights able 
to deliver to such areas.    Understanding the stochastic nature of wind energy and the grid-
cost dynamics of this resource also requires an understanding of system-wide transmission 
outcomes and the associated economic rents generated by wind installations. This requires 
a modeling framework that mimics the special nature of electricity markets, the problems 
posed by inelastic demand and lack of inventory or storage. 
A challenge to the empirical study of renewable energy integration is a lack of data, 
specifically high frequency (hourly or higher frequency) wholesale electricity price data 
that describe market outcomes.  Spot prices for electricity in specific regions are not 
available in many areas as spot markets do not exist.  Where such markets exist, prices are 
often reported as an index of average prices representing lower frequency intervals.  The 
nature of demand, renewable generation changes, as well as transmission congestion on an 
electricity system is that they are intermittent.  Congestion can occur in several hours in a 
day and then disappear for several hours or days depending on network conditions.  In 
order to understand the nature of intermittent sources, congestion rents and price impacts, 
high frequency (hourly or better) data is necessary.  To overcome this challenge simulation 
methods are used here to model market prices and estimate potential congestion effects 
using available hourly demand and transmission data.       
This paper informs policy with a simulation model of an electrical grid that 
incorporates the stochastic nature of wind resources to explore the dynamics of system 
costs.   Results are presented for a model of the Rocky Mountain Power Area (RMPA), an 
area that encompasses most of the state of Wyoming, all of the state of Colorado and small 
areas of some adjacent states in the western United States.  This area is of particular 
interest to consider the potential economic issues of integrating wind resources for several 
reasons.  First, areas of the RMPA have some of the best potential for wind power 
development in the United States.  Second, this area experienced a significant build-out of 
wind development and other transmission sources over a short period of time while 
transmission capacity and other grid conditions remained relatively unchanged.  Third, 
because of its relative size compared to other control regions in the United States, the 
Rocky Mountain Area is more easily modeled than other larger regions.  These 
characteristics allow a study of the area to inform and quantify the congestion costs of 
integrating large quantities of wind energy onto an electricity grid.   
The simulation model used to model the RMPA minimizes estimated system costs 
while meeting transmission constraints and power demand on an hourly basis using actual 
data from the years 2008 to 2010 to simulate hourly generation, price outcomes and 
network congestion conditions.  Two types of generation sources are used with unique cost 
and capacity characteristics reflecting actual field relationships: (i) traditional and non-
intermittent sources including fossil-fuel thermal-generating (coal and natural gas) units 
and hydro-electric generation, historically developed to exploit the existing natural 
resources in the study area, (ii) wind generators whose cost and capacity conditions reflect 
the local stochastic climate conditions.  Using the model output, hourly estimates are 
computed of efficient power market prices.  When transmission congestion occurs these 
are used to estimate congestion rents that occur over a three-year period.  These rents 
form an estimate of the social benefits of reducing grid congestion through possible 
transmission system expansion if additional renewable resources are to be added to the 
electrical grid.  Congestion rents are also related to wind outcomes to describe the 
potential impediments to wind development caused by grid conditions, and which may 
explain observed patterns of actual development while predicting future challenges to 
additional large scale wind development.   
Such information is critically important to policy-makers, especially if there is to 
continue to be public-sector involvement in fostering conditions for renewable energy 
development and integration, and in identifying where such public involvement would be 
most beneficial.  For example, the state of Wyoming’s wind generation capacity in the RMPA 
increased by a factor of eight from 2007 to 2010, jumping from 143.4 MW of potential capacity in 2007 
to over 1,129 MW.  Since then, however, no new generation capacity has been added yet the potential in 
the state is still largely untapped. In Colorado during the period from 2008-2010 only 236 MW of wind 
capacity was built (increasing from 1063 MW to 1299 MW), but since then it has increased by over 
500MW, with an additional 16,602 MW planned.
1
  This shift in development has had significant 
economic impact to both states.  According to officials in Wyoming and Colorado, the greatest 
impediment to additional development in both states is the lack of transmission capacity out of the RMPA 
necessary as the combined planned development in both states is twice their peak demand levels.  
Transmission congestion between Wyoming and Colorado within the RMPA, however, has also been 
cited as the reason why development in Colorado continues to occur while in Wyoming development has 
not since 2010, despite the fact that wind resources in Wyoming are considered to be better than those in 
Colorado. To overcome this hurdle the state of Wyoming embarked on financing a $200 million 
transmission capacity enhancement between the two states.  Some might wonder why, if such 
development were so valuable, is state involvement necessary when in the past private entities have 
developed such transmission capacity? This question is even more relevant given several multi-billion 
dollar fully private projects are underway to expand potential transmission capacity out of Wyoming to 
locations over five times more distant.  This puzzle regarding why there is less private interest in making 
smaller investments to improve transmission infrastructure to nearby markets than to embark on very 
expensive projects to serve more distant ones is also an example of questions that might be answered 
using such a model.      
The paper proceeds as follows:  a description of the generation, transmission and 
institutional context present in the western United States and Canada is described and the 
study region is introduced.  A simple theoretical model is then presented to describe the 
electricity dispatch problem.   A solution to this system provides a simulation framework 
that can then be parameterized for the study region.  A simple parameterization of the 
Rocky Mountain Power Area is outlined in a static context to demonstrate how problems of 
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 American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) website, 2012. 
intermittency and transmission capacity can impact energy cost outcomes.  Solutions are 
then presented from the hourly simulation model. These results are used to estimate 
market price outcomes and to describe how the rents created by wind generation can vary 
with the stochastic nature of wind as an energy resource, as well as the stochastic nature of 
electricity demand, and how these rents could be influenced by the existence of specific 
transmission constraints.  Conclusions are then presented based on the findings described. 
 
Electricity Generation in the Rocky Mountain Power Area.  
 
The North American electricity-grid in Canada and the United States actually 
consists of three separate and isolated grids, the eastern and western interconnects, and 
the ERCOT (Texas) interconnect. These span the United States and Canada and include a 
small portion of Mexico.  The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
administrates standards to ensure the coordination between interconnections and the reliability of 
the grid within each.  Electricity generation and supply in the western United States and 
Canada is administrated by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), which 
further sub-divides this grid into four reporting areas, one of which is the Rocky Mountain Power 
Area (RMPA).  The geographic boundaries of the WECC administrated western interconnection 
and the RMPA are shown in Figure 1. 
The Rocky Mountain Power Area (RMPA) provides power to over 5.5 million people 
within all or parts of five US states: the entire state of Colorado, eastern and central 
Wyoming, portions of western South Dakota and Nebraska, and a small area in the extreme 
northwest corner of New Mexico.  Figure 2 presents the RMPA transmission network.  
Power to retail customers is primarily supplied by three regulated investor owned utilities, 
and several much smaller municipal utilities and rural electric associations.2  These entities 
engage in generation and/or purchase wholesale power through bilateral trades with 
suppliers of electricity.  Generation facilities are located throughout the RMPA, however 
renewable sources; specifically wind generators are primarily located in central Wyoming 
and northeastern Colorado.  Transmission access to deliver generated power to RMPA 
load-centers may be scheduled through utilities’ own transmission facilities or through two 
transmission networks.  A simplified schematic of the RMPA transmission networks is 
shown in Figure 2. The simulations presented here assume an efficient market outcome 
and ignore any price distortions that may actually occur due to these institutional realities.3   
Modeling Framework 
 To model and evaluate the wind energy generation, transmission and policy issues 
within the RMPA, a DC load-flow modeling framework is used to model hourly generation 
price and generation outcomes as an approximation to the actual AC system.4 The modeling 
framework follows the nodal pricing model outlined by Green (2007) and formalizes the 
choice of generation sources used (referred to as “dispatch”) to serve a given demand or 
“load” subject to the technical constraints of the electric-power network. The general 
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 Three investor owned utilities serve the RMPA: Rocky Mountain Power (a subsidiary of PacifiCorp) in central and 
southeast Wyoming, Black Hills Power serving eastern Wyoming, parts of Nebraska, South Dakota and Colorado, 
and the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel Energy) serving central Colorado including the Denver region.  
There are also 29 municipal utilities in Colorado and three in Wyoming, 15 rural electrical cooperatives in the 
RMPA area of Wyoming and 26 in Colorado (Navigant, 2010 and Wyoming Office of Consumer Advocate website.           
3
 The RMPA does not utilize an organized power market. Some authors have noted that the existence of multiple 
power providing agencies using bilateral power contracts could result in a less than efficient outcome (Beck, 2009).  
4
 Such a modeling framework is not suitable for modeling physical and engineering operations, but it is generally 
accepted that a DC modeling methodology is reasonable to determine general economic outcomes as it can 
capture the technical constraints and conditions that determine system pricing and generation (see Green, 2007). 
Markets for spinning reserve or reactive power, also very important to an electricity system are not modeled. 
modeling problem assumes that the system minimizes generation cost.5 The relevant cost 
of electricity generation is the variable cost of producing each unit of output measured in 
megawatts (MW), and ignores fixed costs of production.6  Total costs are minimized 
relative to the technical constraints of the system; specifically that generation (supply 
including line losses)  and demand are always balanced, that total generation cannot 
exceed generation capacity plus system net imports, and that transmission flows do not 
exceed capacity constraints. Generation and demand occurs at all nodes in the transmission 
system, and transmission systems allow power flows between nodes.  The general problem 
to be solved on an hourly basis can be described as  
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 Unlike Green, 2007 and other papers, due to the hourly frequency of the simulation we do not maximize net 
benefit and take reported demand within the region as given.  This makes the demand modeled perfectly inelastic.  
6
 This is consistent with the theory of profit maximization in the short run.  Variable costs include include fuel and 
production input costs, operation and maintenance costs that vary with the quantity of output. See standard 
textbook descriptions of electricity market theory such as Stoft (2002) for an overview of the relevant cost factors.        
 hich gives the associated Lagrangian: 
         
 
   
 
   
        
 
   
            
 
   
 
   
                
                 
where dk is the net demand at node k, wj,k is the power generated at generator j in node k 
where k = 1, 2 and z is the flow of power along the transmission line connecting nodes k = 1, 
2 given the RMPA can be modeled as a 2-node network.  Transmission lines each have a 
fixed capacity of zmax and flow on the transmission line is defined as the difference between 
demand and supply in each node.  Total line losses in the system are l.  NI defines 
exogenous system net imports of generated power from outside the RMPA and can be 
positive or negative.  Generators cannot exceed their capacity.7  e is the Lagrangian 
multiplier associated with the energy balance constraint that demand plus line losses must 
equal generated power and any net imports, and TS is the multiplier associated with the 
transmission line i capacity constraint.  The first order conditions of equation (6) with 
respect to optimal choice of generator choice and output (dispatch) and taking constraints 
and net imports as given, the optimal price at each node in a 2-node system can be found: 
          
  
   
               .8 
The multiplier on the energy balance constraint is equal to the marginal cost of generation 
at the swing bus in the absence of line losses, where the swing bus is the node defined to 
contain the last unit of generation called upon in an optimal (cost minimizing) dispatch.  
Due to the existence of line losses, more or less than one unit of generation can be required 
to create an additional unit of power.  Increasing line losses would require a greater than 
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 We assume that the all generators face no constraints regarding the ability to supply less than full capacity. 
8
 In more complicated systems with more than one route to some nodes, net transfer distribution factors 
describing net power flows must also be defined.  See the Appendix in Green (2007).     
one unit increase in generation to create one more unit of power at the load, but if due to 
line constraints, the optimal configuration of generators across the network changed to 
accommodate the extra power, it can also be the case that line losses will fall, resulting in 
less than one unit of additional generated power being necessary to create one additional 
unit of power delivered to final demand.9    
The second term in this equation shows how line constraints affect marginal costs at 
each node. When the transmission constraint is non-binding, TS =0 and the price in the two 
nodes is equal.  Consider a cost minimizing outcome in a 2-node system and suppose that in 
the optimal solution the combined load of both nodes is just met by the combined 
generation in each node, with the last unit of generation dispatched in the upstream node.  
If a single transmission line operates between the nodes and is just at maximum capacity 
(in which case the transmission line is said to be “just congested”), any additional unit of 
demand added at the downstream node will require the additional generation to take place 
in that node and the transmission constraint will be binding.  The price in node 2 will differ 
from that in node 1, with the price in node 1 equal to the price of the marginal unit of 
generation there, and the price in node 2 equal to the price of the marginal generation at 
the new source of generation.  The value of TS would then become the difference between 
the marginal costs of the last generators dispatched in each node.  The second multiplier in 
(2) is then the difference between the cost of power on the network at the swing bus and 
the marginal cost at a node with a line constraint.  
                                                          
9
 In electrical systems it is possible the additional unit of power would cause power flows to change across the 
network and could reduce line losses (see Green, 2007 or Stoft, 2002) 
To implement the cost minimization model summarized in a simulation context the 
transmission network described in Figure 2 can be reduced to a 2-node network.  This 
methodology is consistent with published results in other power studies including DOE 
(2009).10  Node 1 comprises all areas in the RMPA north of Wyoming border and Node 2 all 
areas south (the state of Colorado).  Power can flow between Wyoming and Colorado only 
using a transmission pathway referred to in the industry as Path 36/TOT3.  Figure 3 
presents the simplified nodal network, identifying average demands, generation capacities 
transmission capacities used in the simulations.  WECC Path Data is used to define NI for 
the pathways shown in Figure 2 leading out of the RMPA and it is subtracted from total 
nodal loads consistent with Equation 3.11      
Implementing the simulation model also required identifying RMPA generation 
potential.  Generator capacities by site were defined using EIA form 860 data for over 360 
individual sources.  Fuel sources within the RMPA include coal, natural gas, hydropower, 
diesel fuel, wind, solar power, and renewable gases.  Table 1 describes generation capacity 
by fuel type or power source within the RMPA at the end of 2008 and changes in capacity 
through 2010.  The growth of wind resources is clear – wind potential grows 66% from 
8.8% to 13.1% of total generation capacity from 2008-2010.  The only other major source 
of growth in generation capacity over this time period was in coal generation, which 
increased by 12%, increasing coal’s share of total potential generation from 40.4% to 
40.8%.  The growth in wind capacity was from 2008-2010 is even more dramatic when 
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 WECC (2012) and DOE (2009) model the RMPA as a three-node system splitting Colorado into eastern and 
western nodes. Both studies find no congestion on this pathway, these two areas are modeled as a single node.       
11
 Data for the TOT80 southeast Montana link is only available in 2010 and average only 50MW.  We assume in 
other years these flows are zero.  Path 19 is also not included. It operates at 100% capacity to export power from 
two dedicated plants in Wyoming that do not serve the RMPA.  Remaining lines in Figure 2 are used to define NI.   
considered by Node.  Wind generation capacity in Wyoming (Node 1) increases by from 
143 MW to 1130 MW of potential power, while Colorado Wind potential increases by 229 
MW to 1292.1 MW over the same period.        
To estimate an efficient dispatch outcome that minimizes total generation costs as 
previously outlined, individual generator costs must be identified or estimated. Since such 
costs are proprietary, little of such data exists publicly.  Many cost estimates exist in the 
economic and policy literature, but these studies most often consider the capital costs 
necessary to create new generating capacity, which are inappropriate for use in the 
theoretic model described.12  Marginal generator costs are instead estimated using 
published production engineering estimates of their determinants, plant characteristics 
from EIA Form 860 data, published fuel and transport costs, and transmission costs based 
on the location of generators.  The methodology used to estimate these costs 
deterministically is detailed in the Appendix.13 Figure 4 shows the modeled efficient 
dispatch “merit order” or supply curve for the entire RMPA assuming no transmission 
congestion occurs between nodes using summer 2008 reported peak capacities, and 
estimated marginal costs by generator expressed in 2008 dollars.  Maximum generator 
capacities are shown by fuel type, which determines plant marginal costs.  Lowest cost 
generators in the dispatch order are renewable sources: solar, wind and hydro as their fuel 
is effectively free and the only costs faced are those operations and maintenance costs that 
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 Studies often consider “levelized” costs - all capital and fixed costs, financing costs and forecasted operating 
costs averaged over the projected lifetime of the plant.  Others cite the “overnight cost” of a plant - the total cost 
to construct a plant if it were built in one night. Neither of these costs is appropriate to model dispatch. In the long 
run, fixed costs are covered by the economic rents created by inframarginal units of generation. See Stoft (2002).     
13
 An alternative method is to derive plant efficiencies using reported fuel use and output also reported on the EIA 
Form 860 surveys.  This was attempted, however, missing or incomplete data across some generators combined 
with problems in the reported data that yielded unreasonable efficiencies. 
increase with output.  Solar and wind power have significant intermittency and the 
potential effect on the estimated supply curve of wind intermittency in particular is shown 
by the broken line which reduces wind capacity to 12% of potential capacity as used by 
NERC to estimate system reliability. If renewables were to provide 100% potential power, 
this would shift the supply curve by about 1300MW to the right, and this could significantly 
alter power market conditions.                       
To illustrate the hourly power dispatch market outcomes the simulation model 
computes (without the complication of transmission congestion) and how they vary with 
the potential intermittency of wind generation, Figure 4 shows summary measures of 
actual 2008 hourly RMPA load data reported, along with NERC’s summer 2008 forecast 
peak load (NERC, 2008).  The efficient market price and quantity of electricity is shown for 
the minimum, maximum (average and forecast), average, 5% and 95% load levels by the 
intersection of the supply curve and these demand levels, conditional on wind output.14  
The estimated equilibrium wholesale price of electricity in the market would have ranged 
from a minimum cost of $15.38/MWh to a maximum of $77.02 ($77.10 at the forecast 
peak), would have ranged from $15.50 to $39.63 in ninety percent of the hours in 2008, 
and averaged $29.38 over 2008 assuming that the wind output was 12% of potential 
capacity.  This is a very conservative worst-case scenario but in any hour the shift of the 
supply curve could be more dramatic than presented as occasionally almost no wind power 
is present on the grid.  At maximum wind potential, the efficient market prices at the given 
loads would have ranged from $12.24 to $45.90/MWh ($59.76 at the forecast maximum), 
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 It is understood solar intermittency would have an impact as well, however, as shown by the generation shares 
in Table 1, wind is the primary source of intermittency.  
would have ranged from $12.93 to $39.21 in ninety percent of the hours, and averaged 
$15.50 over the year.  These results, however, assume no congestion occurs on the 
transmission pathway between Nodes 1 and 2.  If congestion were to occur, the RMPA 
market would separate into two distinct markets, and a dispatch solution similar to that in 
shown in Figure 4 would be computed in each.  Power would flow along the transmission 
line from the node with the lower price to that with the higher price. The supply curve in 
the higher priced node would be composed of the residual supply curve from Node 1 up to 
the capacity of the transmission line and the generator marginal costs located in that node.   
Hourly simulation solutions solve the simple problem illustrated in Figure 4 using 
estimated generator marginal costs, generator capacities for traditional generators, 
simulated wind capacities using weather data at each wind farm in the RMPA, actual RMPA 
demand data and actual transmission constraints hourly from 2008 to 2010.  The hourly 
wind outcomes used in the simulations are summarized in Figure 5 and Tables 2 and 3.  
The RMPA included 28 windfarms in 21 separate locations during the 2008-2010 period.  
As noted in Tables 1 and 2, wind capacity grew over the simulation period.  Lacking data on 
exact start-up dates for new expansions, a plant was assumed to come online in the first 
hour of the month it began operation.  To model the wind at each plant location, the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Western Wind Dataset was used.15  This 
dataset models hourly wind patterns across the western United States based on 2004-2006 
data over 32,403 actual and potential windfarm locations in the western United States.  The 
meteorological model also accounts for and simulates spatial and temporal correlations 
across the region.  Data from the nearest locations modeled by NREL to each of the RMPA 
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 Information regarding this dataset can be found at NREL's Western Wind Dataset webpage portal. 
windfarms was used to simulate wind outcomes by farm.16  The summary data in Table 2 
explains why wind resources are so valued, particularly in Wyoming.  The average capacity 
factor of all Wyoming sources in the simulation was 41.1% while in Colorado it was 27.3%.  
Both wind areas have a strong seasonal component as well as a diurnal one, and both 
experience stronger winds and higher capacity factors in winter than summer months.  
Colorado wind tends to peak at night, while Wyoming wind often a peaks in late afternoon.           
Hourly balancing area load-data from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) Form 714 was used to define nodal demands.17 Since balancing areas do not 
correspond to the nodes defined in the simulations, it was assumed  underlying demand is 
similar on a per-person basis in each node, and annual county-level census data from 2008-
2010 was used to define nodal demands as the population-weighted shares of the total 
load.  This leaves an asymmetric pair of markets with Node 2 accounting for approximately 
88% of total demand over the three year period.  Demand patterns on a daily basis reflect a 
typical diurnal pattern, peaking in daylight hours, with clear shoulder periods in evening 
and mornings, and minimum demand occurring overnight.  Seasonal peaks occur in mid-
summer, with a secondary peak in mid-winter.  The data may also contain an economic 
cycle, with average load falling during the 2008-2009 national recession. Hourly demands 
are treated as perfectly inelastic and exogenous in the simulation model, as almost all 
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 Capacity factor refers to actual power produced relative to the potential generation, or "nameplate" capacity.   
17
 FERC Form 714 data reports load by the two RMPA balancing areas controlled by Xcel Energy and the Western 
Area Power Administration. As data is only reported for the Xcel Energy balancing area in 2008, the missing was 
estimated using the hourly proportional load differences between areas in 2009 to weight the data in the observed 
area for 2008. These estimates were then added to the reported data in 2008 to create an estimate of total hourly 
load.  This data was then compared to data published in Beck (2009) describing average, maximum, minimum, 5% 
and 95% load levels.  The constructed data overstated the reported average, maximum and minimum loads by 
approximately 5.2% and was deflated by this amount.  Resultant estimates of hourly load at the 5% and 95% levels 
differed by less than 2% from those in Beck (2009) and were used as proxies for actual 2008 hourly load outcomes.         
residential and commercial demand in the region does not have real-time metering, nor are 
instantaneous spot prices posted or charged.  The three year demand pattern is shown in 
Figure 5 and described in Table 3.   
The ability of the grid to maintain low generation costs depends on transmission 
constraints present on the grid.  Actual hourly transmission limits for Path 36/TOT3 in 
2008-2010 are also described in Figure 5 and Table 3.  While the nominal capacity of this 
link is 1605MW, its maximum rating in any given hour can vary depending on load and 
generation conditions, temperature and weather, maintenance operations and 
configuration changes, other transmission line conditions in the RMPA and reliability 
considerations.18 For these reasons the average capacity over the simulation period was 
1331 MW with a standard deviation of 173 MW.  Transmission rights across this link are 
determined by the ownership of the lines, which are both privately and publicly owned.  As 
of 2008, 71.4% of the capacity was owned by a consortium of utilities and agencies 
involved in the Missouri Basin Power Project and owners of the Laramie River Generating 
station in Wheatland, Wyoming, which can produce up to 1140 MW of power for the RMPA.  
The remaining Path 36/TOT3 capacity is held by Xcel Energy (3.7%) and the federally 
owned Western Area Power Administration (24.9%), which markets transmission rights 
on its share of the link. 
Results: 
 Electricity price outcomes are solved using the dispatch model and incorporating 
actual RMPA demand (load) and transmission constraints, estimated generation costs, 
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 Some reserve is usually maintained to ensure that if a failure occurred elsewhere on the system, resulting 
changes in power-flows could be accommodated.   
wind conditions over the 26,304 hours simulating Jan 1, 2008 at 12:00 am to December 31, 
2010 at 11:00 pm.  A simulated unconstrained transmission solution in which no 
transmission capacity was imposed between Nodes 1 and 2 was also computed using GAMS 
to determine the impact of transmission constraints on the system. Results were also used 
to consider the effects of wind intermittency and increased capacity on power prices and 
transmission congestion, and to construct an estimate of congestion rents created by 
inadequate transmission capacity between the two nodal markets.  A summary of the 
computed market price outcomes is presented in Table 4.   
Price results indicate the effects of congestion on the grid.  When the transmission 
constraint is not binding price differentials disappear between Nodes 1 and 2.  Comparison 
of the efficient results to the results using the actual Path 36/TOT3 transmission limits 
shows the constraint causes average prices in Node 1 to fall and Node 2 to rise relative to 
the unconstrained case, as expected if power flows from north to south along the 
transmission link.  The impact of the constraint appears to increase over time as the 
average price differential increases in each year, as does the standard deviation of prices in 
Node 1 and for the price differential.  Node 2 prices fall on average throughout the 
simulation.  Despite the fact that, all else equal, congestion should raise price in the 
downstream node relative to the unconstrained outcome, the increase in the amount of 
cheaper wind energy available in Node 1 over the simulation period both creates 
transmission congestion which has the effect of raising Node 2 prices, and reduces the cost 
of power exported from Node 1, potentially reducing costs in Node 2.  In the unconstrained 
transmission simulation the first effect is clear as the availability of increased low-cost 
wind energy over time reduces average power prices.          
The change in congestion over time can also be seen by comparing annual price 
differential outcomes.  Figure 6 shows the duration of price differentials expressed as a 
percentage of the total hours in each year of the simulation.  Price differentials of a penny 
or more between the nodal markets occur in only 7.2% of the hours in 2008, but this rises 
to 20.5% of hours in 2009 and 69.3% in 2010.  Additionally the maximum price differential 
increases from $26.23 in 2008 to $30.15 in 2010, while average price differentials increase 
from $0.67 to $9.46 in the same simulated period.  While the incidence of congestion will 
always occur more often when transmission capacity is reduced, as growth in wind 
capacity occur ed in Node 1 the transmission capacity constraint appears binding in 
significantly more hours regardless of the constraint level.         
To quantify this impact a Tobit regression was run to determine the relationships 
between demand, transmission capacity and the level of wind capacity available upstream 
and downstream of the transmission constraint.  These results are shown in Table 5.  All 
else equal, one would expect that growth in demand, which is always distributed in our 
model proportionate to population in each node to reduce congestion as it allows the 
upstream node a greater ability to absorb available power, leaving less for export.  A 
tightened transmission constraint will increase congestion.  One would also expect that 
since wind is unpredictable but nearly free when available, greater wind output in Node 1 
would increase congestion by making more cheap power available for export to Node 2.  
Increased wind in Node 2, however, would lessen the demand for Node 1 power as efficient 
dispatch would use this energy first given it is cheaper than any exported power from Node 
1 (it incurs no transmission costs since it is located in Node 2 and generation costs at each 
wind location are assumed equal), which in turn would reduce congestion.  Regression 
results suggest the marginal effects of transmission constraints and wind output in Node 1 
are an order of magnitude greater than demand changes or wind output changes in Node 2 
suggesting these are the two primary determinants of transmission congestion price 
differentials.  On average, throughout the three year period, a 100 MW increase in 
transmission capacity would reduce the price differentials by $3.75 while an increase of 
100 MW of wind output in Node 1 (equivalent to approximately 243 MW of new capacity 
given the average capacity factor of Node 1 wind-farms) would increase the average price 
differential by $4.26.    
To quantify the cost of increased congestion caused by additional wind capacity and 
inadequate transmission capacity, congestion rents were also determined.  These rents 
were computed as the value of the exported flows from Node 1 to Node 2 given the price 
differential in that hour.  These form our estimate of the potential benefit of additional 
transmission capacity being under efficient market conditions.19  To determine the amount 
of capacity necessary to avoid these rents, simulations were also run increasing the 
available transmission capacity in each hour by 100 MW increments up to 1000 MW.   
Table 6 describes the congestion rents that were estimated to occur and the estimated 
avoided rents of each additional 100 MW increment of transmission capacity. Results show 
the increase in congestion rents accruing to transmission rights holders as predicted 
congestion increased over time.  Again, these appear to have been driven by the additional 
generation capacity installed on the grid, particularly wind.20  The estimated value of total 
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 Actual benefits in the RMPA are potentially higher given the fact that the wholesale market is not organized as a 
competitive auction but instead relies on bilateral agreements between utility providers and power generators.  
20
 Table 1 reports 1006 MW additional coal and gas-fired generation came online in 2008-2010, however, only 
185MW was added in node 2, thus little of this new capacity would have added to congestion.  New coal and gas 
also sources tend to displace in dispatch as opposed to increasing nodal power output.   
rents accrued over the three simulated years was over $141 million.  As shown in Table 6, a 
relatively small addition of transmission capacity could have significantly reduced total 
congestion rents in any year, with the first 100 MW potentially avoiding over 29% of the 
total rents generated, and over half of the total rents generated in the years 2008 and 2009 
respectively.  In the first two years of the simulation an additional 500 and 700 MW of 
capacity would have eliminated all congestion rents, while a 1000 MW increase would have 
been necessary to nearly eliminate all rents in 2010.         
Analysis of the distribution of estimated rents and how they change reveals how the 
price and quantity changes in the market affect generator’s revenues, especially in the 
presence of transmission congestion.  Given the ownership of transmission rights over the 
Path 36/TOT3 link, a single consortium of companies involved in the Missouri Basin Power 
controlling one coal-generating station (the Laramie River Station) could earn an estimated 
$101 million share of the rents generated under current market conditions.21  Only just 
over $35 million could be earned from users of the transmission rights marketed by the 
Western Area Power Administration’s (WAPA) to other producers in Node 1.22  The largest 
utility in Node 2, Xcel Energy would be estimated to receive a $5.2 million share of these 
rents.   
A further analysis of rents accruing to all producers in Nodes 1 and 2 is presented in 
Table 7.  The presence of congestion and the impacts this has on prices in each node are 
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 Results suggest that the Laramie River Station would only earn $87.6 million from rents due to exports to Node 
2. The efficient dispatch would allocate some of this plant’s production to Node 1, leaving it unable to use its entire 
transmission rights allocation.  If the plant could sell its excess transmission rights to other firms in Node 1 it could 
potentially capture the rents available, thus the actual rents to accruing to the consortium would likely be between 
$87.6 million and $101 million.     
22
 This assumes WAPA sells rights at a fixed price.  WAPA could potentially capture the rents through an auction.    
clear from comparison of profits for generators in Nodes 1 and 2 under the simulations 
using actual hourly transmission limits, and those that could occur if such constraints were 
not present.  In Node 1, 9% of potential profits are lost due to congestion and the resultant 
lower prices in that node, costing almost $80 million over the three years of the simulation.  
Node 2 producers reap the benefit of the higher prices the congestion causes, which causes 
total profits to rise by over $88 million, or over 4% relative to outcomes had no 
transmission congestion occurred over the three years.   
Wind producers are even more affected than the general market in Node 1 by profit 
losses due to congestion effects.  Because of the cost-minimizing dispatch that is assumed 
to occur in each node, wind power is almost always sold in the node it is produced.  For 
Node 1 producers, very seldom is there a surplus of power available for export after such 
dispatch occurs thus they earn very little rents.  As wind capacity increases in Node 1 this 
pushes coal-fired generation up the supply curve and closer to the margin, and contrary to 
what might be expected, this actually can benefit some coal-producers as it allows them to 
export more of their power and in times of congestion this allows coal-fired producers to 
earn most of the congestion rents available.   The result is improved profitability for the 
coal-generation sector over what it would have been without such rents.   
Wind producers in Node 1 have the opposite experience, and as their power 
production rises over time, which then causes more congestion on the grid, prices fall in 
Node 1, lowering wind-producer’s profitability.  In effect, windier conditions, causing 
greater wind production costs wind producers while benefiting coal producers.  Wind 
profits are almost 38% lower than they would be in the absence of congestion, and wind 
producers suffer almost 47% of the total profit loss experienced in the Node 1 due to 
congestion effects. Most of the remainder of the profit loss in Node 1, particularly in the last 
year of the simulation is experienced by hydro-electric producers.23  While some coal 
plants can experience profit loss due to congestion-caused lower prices in Node 1, as a 
sector, coal-generation in Node 1 becomes the primary export power source when 
congestion occurs and actually experiences increased profits when congestion occurs. 24 
Node 2 wind producers benefit from the congestion caused by abundant and low-cost 
production in Node 1.  Their profits over the entire simulation rise by 22% relative to 
simulations without a transmission constraint, accounting for 44% of the total profit 
increase in that node.   
Discussion of Results   
The impact of the additional wind output in our simulated RMPA markets is 
dramatic when transmission congestion occurs.  Congestion caused by additional wind 
energy causes regional market prices to diverge, sometimes significantly on average from 
those that would occur in uncongested circumstances.  Price results presented in Table 4 
for the RMPA simulations suggest the greatest impact to prices occurs in Node 1 where 
prices fall due to the stranded wind power flooding the local nodal market and driving 
wholesale prices downward.  While it may seem initially counter-intuitive, additional wind 
energy arriving on the grid is not necessarily a benefit to wind producers as the price 
decreases caused in Node 1 by congestion can eliminate much of the additional profits the 
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 Hydro electric generation accounts for 290.1 MW of potential power in Node 1 and collectively defines the next 
step on the supply curve above wind generators.  Coal generators are collectively grouped in the next portion of 
the supply curve for Node 1, and the marginal generation type in most hours.     
24
 Node 1 coal-generator costs are much lower than those in Colorado due to their location to nearby coal-mines.  
This results in exported power from Wyoming always being dispatched in Colorado when it is available.    
additional power might create.  Further, traditional fossil-fuel power producers are 
displaced in the dispatch queue by sudden and unpredicted increases in wind power.  
While this could be expected to lower the profits and return to these capital assets if their 
generated power were dispatched locally, both due to the lower prices congestion creates 
and potentially reduced power output as more expensive coal-fired power becomes less 
competitive, this need not happen.   Our simulations show that if these plants have 
transmission rights, exporting their power to neighbouring markets where prices due to 
congestion become higher can allow them to offset such losses and actually benefit from 
the presence of wind-generators.  Overall then, the addition of unpredictable wind 
resources in a transmission constrained area such as Wyoming can have the effect of 
lowering returns to capital for wind producers in that area relative uncongested 
conditions, while having an ambiguous effect on higher-cost traditional generators.25  
Downstream of the congestion the effect is the opposite.  Congestion has the effect of 
driving a wedge between the efficient power price and transmission constrained outcomes, 
raising profits over what they would have been without congestion.  The effect to 
consumers in the downstream market would likely be unambiguous; customers whose 
utilities were forced to pay higher wholesale prices than would occur in the absence of 
congestion would face higher prices.      
The impact of congestion on power market outcomes also may not create price 
incentives for the creation of additional transmission capacity.  In the results presented, the 
estimated additional capacity needed to avoid congestion is over 1000 MW by the end of 
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 In a rate of return regulated utility market, this could also stop reduced wholesale power-rates from being 
passed on to consumers in the area where price has fallen.  If the utility also owned the wind generation, to ensure 
adequate capital return consumer prices may not be allowed to fall.     
the simulation.  While transmission expansion costs vary by location, the Wyoming 
Infrastructure Authority estimates the cost of an 800-900 MW expansion of the Path 
36/TOT3 line modeled to be less than $300 million.26 Simulated Node 1 price outcomes 
and profit outcomes suggest that wind generators have little incentive to provide 
additional transmission capacity to Node 2.  Node 1 wind producers’ lost profits over the 
three year simulation total $37.3 million, suggesting the payoff time to such an investment 
could be decades.  Further, wind generators are owned by multiple firms suggesting that 
coordination for such an investment could be difficult and free-riding incentives could 
undermine any such effort.  Increases in capacity would have no benefit and potentially 
create losses for wind producers downstream of the congestion as it would eliminate most 
of the congestion rents and price differentials occurring that drive their estimated excess 
profits over unconstrained conditions.  Ironically, increases in wind output seem to create 
the greatest benefits in Node 1 to fossil-fuel generators with transmission rights to Node 2 
thus they would have little incentive to invest in additional capacity.  Third-party 
transmission companies may also not be willing to invest in additional transmission 
capacity for the same reasons - doing so would reduce the rents and potential profits of 
building more lines.   
Comparing the predicted simulation outcomes and implied incentives to actual 
development in the RMPA suggests the results are consistent with the observed pattern of 
development.  Initially wind resources were exploited in Colorado nearest the major load 
center in the area (the City of Denver).  While Wyoming’s wind resources were known to be 
superior in quality to those in Colorado they were initially developed slowly.  By the mid-
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 See the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority Wyoming-Colorado Intertie (WCI) project website. 
2000s however, these resources began to be developed quickly by several large power 
companies.  Development of the wind potential appears to have contributed to 
transmission congestion by 2010 in the area, with the result that lower prices in Wyoming 
(Node 1) drove down potential rates of return to these new investments, while raising 
prices over what would otherwise have been expected in the absence of congestion in Node 
2 (Colorado).   While lower rates of return may not necessarily cause consumer electricity 
rates to rise, PacifiCorp did request rate increases in its Rocky Mountain Power service 
area during this time.  The impact, however, of the increased congestion and its effects on 
prices and profits appears to have been in halting wind development in Wyoming.  No new 
wind generation development of any kind has occurred in the Wyoming portion of the 
RMPA since 2010.  Simulation results here suggest that was the year congestion impacts 
became critical.   
In Wyoming, concerns over congestion have spurred the state government’s 
Wyoming Infrastructure Authority (WIA) to engage in transmission development.  The 
stated goal of the WIA was to encourage development of Wyoming’s electricity resources, 
including wind.27  It was understood that without additional transmission capacity to move 
the power to market such development may not occur.  The first major transmission 
project the WIA will complete is an 800 MW expansion of the Path 36/TOT3 transmission 
link to Colorado, at an estimated cost of over $200 million.  The proposed line is currently 
under construction and will be in operation in summer 2014.  The simulations presented 
here suggest the size of expansion will nearly eliminate congestion that would occur under 
efficient dispatch conditions.  The WIA also has been active in developing additional 
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 Wyoming would also like to see additional fossil-fired fired generation created in the state to export power.  
transmission capacity between Wyoming and Colorado.  Other efforts have focused on 
transmission expansion westward to allow wind resources to have transmission access to 
western markets such as California and the Pacific Northwest.  Due to planned renewable 
portfolio standards being implemented in these regions, both areas are expected to have 
significant demand for wind power, and wind resources in Wyoming with their high 
capacity factors could be a very lucrative location for generation.28  
Conclusions:  
This paper has presented a framework for modeling electricity dispatch, with a 
specific application to the Rocky Mountain Power Area.  Specific data sources required to 
model such an area have been identified, and a method of estimating proprietary 
production costs has been outlined.  The outcomes were simulated in efficient as well as 
transmission constrained conditions.  Results indicate that the effects caused by changes in 
wind power output at intermittent sources are dependent on the demand conditions in the 
market and the presence of transmission constraints.  The outcomes may not always be as 
one might expect intuitively due to market imperfections causing outcomes to depart from 
first-best conditions - efficiency outcomes in the presence of second-best market conditions 
may not always be predictable.  Electricity markets are bound to be distorted by such 
market imperfections.  Output is not storable, markets include constraints to output and 
transmission, and rights to use portions of the grid may not be distributed in a manner that 
ensures efficiency.  Accounting for such problems is necessary if economics is to be useful 
in making informed policy decisions. Not accounting for such distortions in a policy 
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 In November 2012, Federal permits were granted for the largest wind farm in the United States to be built in 
central Wyoming (the Chokecherry-Sierra Madre project).  The first phase will have a capacity of over 1000 MW. 
Completion of the project is expected to occur when transmission capacity becomes available.   
assessment may cause the analysis to even worsen market outcomes if the results suggest 
mistaken benefits or costs.             
The simulations presented here demonstrate the club-good aspects of transmission 
capacity.  As a club-good, transmission capacity is excludable but non-rivalrous until 
congestion occurs.   Because the incentives to create additional transmission capacity may 
be weak, transmission may be privately provided at a level that is socially inefficient.  This 
could eliminate incentives to develop otherwise high-quality power resources if the 
location of such resources is distant from adequate transmission capacity and suggests a 
possible role for public involvement in transmission provision.  Finally, the analysis above 
suggests that any policies that effect power pricing are not easily predicted in a market that 
is distorted by technical constraints such as transmission capacity limits.  Market outcomes 
in such circumstances cannot be assumed to be efficient and therefore costs and benefits of 
policy changes (carbon taxes, regional renewable portfolio standards, endangered species 
protections that affect electrical generation or transmission development, wind production 
taxes, or coal severance taxes) that have an impact on electricity production costs may not 
be straightforward to predict.  Similarly it is important to assess the resulting winners and 
losers for any policy change – as demonstrated here, renewable energy expansion may 
benefit the traditional sources it is meant to displace.  The results presented here suggest 
that if society desires more renewable energy sources to be developed, efforts may require 
more than production subsidies to be employed.  Such development may need to focus on 
other impediments such as transmission congestion.               
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Figure 1:  The RMPA within the Western Interconnect. 
   
Source: North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).   
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Figure 2:  RMPA Transmission System including Major Power-flow Pathways   
 
 
 
Source:  NTTG Website with modifications made to show major transmission pathways.   
 
  
Figure 3:  Simplified Nodal Network with Average Simulation Parameters.   
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Figure 4:  RMPA-wide Estimated 2008 Supply Curve assuming no Congestion 
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Figure 5:  Total RMPA Hourly Wind Output, Load and Transmission Capacity  
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Figure 6:   Percentage of hours of Congestion by Year 
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Table 1:  RMPA Electricity Generation by Power Source (2008) 
Power Source  Total 
Nameplate 
Capacity 
(2008) 
% of 
Potential 
Total 
Capacity 
(2008) 
Average Age 
of 
Generating 
Sources 
(2008) 
Change in 
Capacity 
2008-2010 
% Change 
in 
Capacity 
2008-
2010  
Regular 
Generation: 
      
Coal  Bituminous 1,982.9 MW 11.9% 43 years -72.7 MW -3.7% 
 Sub-
bituminous 
4,742.8 MW 28.5% 37 years 881 MW 18.6% 
 Total Coal: 
 
6,725.7 MW 40.4% 39.9 years 808.3 MW 12.0% 
Natural Gas  6,784.1 MW 40.7% 15 years 198 MW 2.9% 
Hydro Pumped 
Storage 
508.5 MW 3.1% 38.4 years 0 0% 
 Hydro 930.3 MW  5.6% 54.6 years 0 0% 
 Total 
Hydro: 
 
1,438.8 MW 8.6% 52.9 years 0 0% 
Petroleum   
 
36.4 MW 0.2% 40 years 0 0% 
Renewable 
Gases 
 10.2 MW >0.1% 3.7 years 0 0% 
Wind   1460.7 MW 8.8% 6.7 years 963.4 MW 66% 
Solar 
 
 11.7 MW >0.1% 1.3 years 56.8 MW 485.4% 
Total Potential 
Regular 
Generation: 
 16,457.6 MW 98.8% 27.8 years 2,026.5 MW 12.3% 
Source:  EIA Data, for 2008 reporting year     
Table 2:  Wind Farm Capacities, Capacity Factors and Locations 
Plant Name (Company) 
 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Year/Month 
Opened 
Capacity 
Factor 
NREL 
Location ID 
 Node 1 
      Medicine Bow (Platte River Power) 
 
8.6 1996-2005 41.4% 18519 
 Foote Creek (AES SeaWest) 
 
84.8 1999-2000 47.1% 16563 
 Rock River (AES SeaWest) 
 
50 2001 46.5% 31422 
 Happy Jack (Duke) 
 
29.4 2008/8 34.8% 14318 
 Seven Mile Hill (PacifiCorp) 
 
123.6 2008/12 40.1% 18627 
 Glenrock I (PacifiCorp) 
 
99 2008/12 33.4% 23909 
 Glenrock II (PacifiCorp) 
 
39 2009/1 32.6% 23909 
 Rolling Hills (PacifiCorp) 
 
99 2009/1 32.6% 23909 
 High Plains (PacifiCorp) 
 
99 2009/9 39.8% 16676 
 McFadden (PacifiCorp) 
 
28.5 2009/10 39.8% 16676 
 Silver Sage (Duke) 
 
42 2009/10 35.2% 14318 
 Campbell Hill (Duke) 
 
99 2009/12 31.4% 23835 
 Casper Wind Farm (Chevron) 
 
17 2009/12 31.4% 23835 
 Dunlap (PacifiCorp) 
 
111 2010/10 34.6% 19280 
 Top of the World (Duke) 
 
200 2010/10 35.6% 23389 
 Node 1 Total (end of 2010) 
 
1129.9 
    Average Capacity Factor* 
   
41.1% 
  Standard Deviation 
   
32.7% 
  Node 2 
      Ponnequinn (Xcel) 
 
31.6 1998-2001 25.8% 13661 
 Ridge Creek (Enxco) 
 
29.7 2001 25.4% 13547 
 Colorado Green Holdings (PPM) 
 
162 2003 33.6% 31007 
 Lamar (City of Lamar) 
 
6 2004 25.1% 31053 
 Spring Canyon (Invenergy) 
 
60 2006 24.9% 13462 
 Cedar Creek (Babcock & Brown) 
 
300.5 2007 26.5% 13282 
 Logan (Logan Wind) 
 
201 2007 26.4% 13667 
 Twin Buttes (PPM) 
 
75 2007 33.6% 30973 
 Peetz Table (FPL Peetz) 
 
199.5 2007 26.4% 13667 
 Northern Colorado (Northern CO Wind) 
 
174.3 2009/8 26.7% 13667 
 DOE Golden (NREL) 
 
3.8 2010/1 19.4% 11949 
 Vestas Towers (Vestas) 
 
1.8 2010/4 21.4% 9981 
 Kit Carson (Duke)  
 
51 2010/11 30.9% 10928 
 Node 2 Total (end of 2010) 
 
1296.2 
    Average Capacity Factor* 
   
27.3% 
  Standard Deviation 
   
23.3% 
  Capacity Factor Correlation - Node1 - Node2 (2008-2010):  
 
0.403 
  * Actual simulated average over entire node, weighted for power output and new plant openings 
 Table 3:  Simulation Parameter Summary 
 
 
Year 
Demand 
(load) MW 
Path 
36/TOT3 
Limit (MW) 
Total Wind 
Output 
(MW) 
Node 1  
Wind 
Output 
(MW) 
Node 2 
Wind 
Output 
(MW) 
       Maximum 2008 11562.7 1510.4 1433.4 393.0 1057.9 
 
2009 11007.6 1516.9 2019.6 812.9 1232.8 
 
2010 11736.6 1680.0 2384.7 1121.5 1284.5 
 
2008-2010 11736.6 1680.0 2384.7 1121.5 1284.5 
       Minimum 2008 5305.8 702.8 0.3 0 0 
 
2009 5154.7 337.3 0.2 0 0 
 
2010 5540.9 783.9 0.2 0 0 
 
2008-2010 5154.7 337.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 
       Average 2008 7424.8 1321.3 371.3 81.6 289.7 
 
2009 7481.7 1309.2 548.7 235.5 313.2 
 
2010 7690.5 1363.2 717.2 355.6 361.5 
 
2008-2010 7532.2 1331.2 545.6 224.1 321.4 
       Std. dev 2008 1039.4 154.8 296.7 85.5 257.8 
 
2009 993.7 192.2 436.1 207.2 299.3 
 
2010 1065.0 165.6 531.0 304.1 329.5 
 
2008-2010 1039.4 173.1 454.5 245.2 298.5 
       5th 
Percentile 2008 5910 1000 33 1 14 
limit 2009 5798 868 54 8 14 
 
2010 6105 1123 61 16 14 
 
2008-2010 5965 1043 48 3 15 
       95th 
Percentile 2008 9400 1457 998 275 845 
limit 2009 9289 1504 1140 481 812 
 
2010 9675 1559 1715 967 1040 
 
2008-2010 9440 1535 1528 761 963 
 
  
Table 4:  Summary of Computed Price Outcomes  
  
Node 1 
Prices 
(MWh) 
Node2 
Prices 
(MWh) 
Price 
Differential 
(MWh) 
Unconstrained 
Transmission 
Price (MWh) 
      Average Price 
     
 
2008 $28.23 $28.90 $0.67 $28.83 
 
2009 $24.53 $27.23 $2.70 $26.91 
 
2010 $16.23 $25.69 $9.46 $24.02 
 
2008-2010 $23.00 $27.27 $4.27 $26.59 
      Std. Deviation 
     
 
2008 $8.33 $7.67 $3.00 $7.73 
 
2009 $9.66 $8.21 $5.72 $8.41 
 
2010 $10.96 $8.03 $8.40 $8.76 
 
2008-2010 $10.93 $8.08 $7.18 $8.54 
      Maximum 
     
 
2008 $77.04 $77.04 $26.23 $77.04 
 
2009 $59.21 $59.21 $26.39 $59.21 
 
2010 $58.29 $58.29 $30.15 $58.29 
 
2008-2010 $77.04 $77.04 $30.15 $77.04 
      Minimum  
     
 
2008 $12.98 $12.98 $0.00 $12.98 
 
2009 $12.30 $12.30 $0.00 $12.30 
 
2010 $9.28 $11.13 $0.00 $11.05 
 
2008-2010 $9.28 $11.13 $0.00 $11.05 
      5th Percentile 
limit 
     
 
2008 $15.20 $15.50 $0.00 $15.50 
 
2009 $13.02 $13.02 $0.00 $13.02 
 
2010 $9.28 $15.40 $0.00 $12.36 
 
2008-2010 $9.33 $13.10 $0.00 $13.03 
      95th Percentile  
limit 
    
 
2008 $39.55 $39.55 $2.52 $39.55 
 
2009 $39.41 $39.41 $16.13 $39.41 
 
2010 $39.48 $39.48 $20.48 $39.48 
 
2008-2010 $39.48 $39.48 $19.83 $39.48 
Table 5:  Tobit Estimates of Congestion Determinants 
  
Model 
  
All hours 
(2008-2010) 2008 2009 2010 
    Dependent Variable:  
Price Differential 
     
      Total Load Coefficient -0.0012 -0.0044 -0.0016 -0.0014 
 
Std Error 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
Transmission Capacity Coefficient -0.0375 -0.0727 -0.0625 -0.0294 
 
Std Error 0.0006 0.0020 0.0013 0.0007 
Node 1 Wind Output Coefficient 0.0426 0.0696 0.0692 0.0190 
 
Std Error 0.0005 0.00269 0.0014 0.0004 
Node 2 Wind Output Coefficient -0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0114 -0.0032 
 
Std Error 0.0003 0.0009 0.0007 0.0003 
constant Coefficient 44.81 98.40 66.62 52.64 
 
Std Error 1.025 3.327 2.005 1.124 
      Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.1308 0.4205 0.2382 0.0755 
N 
 
26304 8784 8760 8760 
 
All estimates significant at the 1% level 
  
Table 6:  Congestion Rents: Simulations for Incremental Transmission Increases 
 
 
Total 
Congestion 
Rents (2008) 
Total 
Congestion 
Rents (2009) 
Total 
Congestion 
Rents (2009) 
Marginal 
Benefit over 3-
year period 
Actual Transmission 
Capacity  $5,525,970.55 $27,319,391.20 $108,412,969.35 
 Additional 100MW $2,542,875.15 $12,583,105.81 $85,008,067.37 $41,124,282.77 
Additional 200MW $826,741.84 $4,986,294.03 $60,837,514.65 $33,483,497.81 
Additional 300MW $286,899.86 $2,569,009.88 $39,476,142.01 $24,318,498.78 
Additional 400MW $100,444.46 $1,236,684.96 $24,467,186.55 $16,527,735.78 
Additional 500MW $0.00 $293,289.44 $13,494,358.73 $12,016,667.80 
Additional 600MW $0.00 $15,130.60 $6,754,721.38 $7,017,796.19 
Additional 700MW $0.00 $0.00 $2,728,667.26 $4,041,184.71 
Additional 800MW $0.00 $0.00 $1,049,176.32 $1,679,490.94 
Additional 900MW $0.00 $0.00 $343,794.44 $705,381.88 
Additional 1000MW $0.00 $0.00 $92,376.03 $251,418.41 
   
Total $141,165,955.07 
 
  
Table 7:  Estimated Profits by Generators in Nodes 1 and 2 
  
Node 1 Profits (total) Node 2 Profits (total) 
Actual Case 
   
 
2008 $274,846,612 $793,445,870 
 
2009 $259,733,437 $760,503,934 
 
2010 $263,968,557 $692,482,109 
 
2008-2010 $798,548,607 $2,246,431,913 
No 
Transmission 
Constraints 
   
 
2008 $279,398,275 $790,775,650 
 
2009 $278,281,349 $746,697,506 
 
2010 $320,687,047 $619,981,118 
 
2008-2010 $878,366,671 $2,157,454,274 
  
Wind Producer Profits 
(Node 1) 
Wind Producer Profits 
(Node 1) 
Actual Case 
   
 
2008 $14,164,795 $61,391,301 
 
2009 $29,859,944 $64,496,528 
 
2010 $17,082,099 $87,022,761 
 
2008-2010 $61,106,839 $212,910,590 
No 
Transmission 
Constraints 
   
 
2008 $14,978,700 $59,839,860 
 
2009 $38,426,394 $56,967,969 
 
2010 $44,959,251 $56,618,286 
 
2008-2010 $98,364,346 $173,426,115 
Wind Profit % of Total 
  Actual Case 
   
 
2008 5.2% 7.7% 
 
2009 11.5% 8.5% 
 
2010 6.5% 12.6% 
 
2008-2010 7.7% 9.5% 
No 
Transmission 
Constraints 
   
 
2008 5.4% 7.6% 
 
2009 13.8% 7.6% 
 
2010 14.0% 9.1% 
 
2008-2010 11.2% 8.0% 
  
Appendix:    Modeling Generator Marginal Costs:  
 
The most important determinants of generation production cost have been 
identified in the power engineering literature as the technology used in power production, 
the efficiency of that technology, and the fuel cost of the technology.   Critical information to 
estimate these three characteristics is available using US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) Form 860 data, and while private information is not available to 
estimate costs statistically, the power-engineering literature includes known relationships 
from such studies that can be applied to approximate the potential costs conditions each 
generator faces.    
Estimates of marginal costs of production for this study utilize the following simple 
model.  Costs are expressed in price per megawatt hour of production (MWh).   All fuel 
costs are computed using the known conversion constant of MWh to btu equivalent. 
Generator fuel cost can then be computed by assuming a generator’s efficiency and the btu 
content of the fuel it uses.   Efficiencies assumed in this study use published engineering 
studies that detail typical plant efficiencies or “heat-rates” given technology and vintage 
and are detailed in Table 1A, as are the assumed energy contents of the fuels used, and 
assumed transport costs where applicable.  Fuel costs are the average 2007-2009 annual 
fuel costs by type reported by the EIA.29  Conversion factors used are described in Table 2A.   
For example, a bituminous coal-burning power plant with an assumed 30% 
efficiency would have the following estimated fuel cost:  assuming one short-ton of 
                                                          
29
 Fuel costs reported by the EIA typically utilize reported market spot prices. Utilities and generating stations may 
purchase fuel using spot price contracts but more often negotiate contracts as long as 10-years to avoid energy 
price volatility. The nature of such contracts is not available publicly by generator thus average prices over the 
three-year period are used assuming that such contracts will include spot prices as part of the negotiated price.       
bituminous coal contains 23,400,000 btu, at 100% efficiency in the conversion of coal 
energy content to electricity, one short-ton would create (23,400,000/3,412,141.63) = 
6.857863 MWh.  Assuming 30% plant efficiency reduces this electricity output to 2.057359 
MWh/short ton.  Assuming a market price of $42/short ton of bituminous coal in Colorado 
in late 2008 or early 2009 results in a marginal price of $20.41/MWh produced.   
This would be the estimated fuel cost if the plant were located at the mine (a mine-
mouth generator).  Since transport costs are a significant portion of fuel cost, and since coal 
is typically delivered by rail, using the reported EIA freight rates in Colorado for coal and an 
assumed distance to the mine, fuel prices can be adjusted to reflect transport cost.  For 
example, if the mine considered were located 215 miles from the source of coal it uses, and 
assuming the freight rate was $0.0655/ton-mile, the assumed fuel price would increase by 
$14.0825/ton and the marginal fuel cost would rise to approximately $27.48/MWh.  
Transportation costs here reflect EIA way-bill surveys to generators in the Colorado in 
2008 and these are reported by the EIA publicly.30  Utility and power-plant power websites 
typically report location for the plant and the source of coal by mine thus typical shipping 
distances and costs can be accounted for in the estimation of generator fuel costs per MWh.  
Estimation of generator marginal production costs should also include any other marginal 
cost of production and power delivery, including the variable portion of operations and 
maintenances costs (O&M) and transmission costs to bring the power to market as shown 
in Equation 1A.   
  
MC per MWh = fuel cost per MWh (including freight costs) + O&M per MWh + transmission per MWh. (1A) 
 
                                                          
30
 See The EIA waybill survey data at http://205.254.135.7/coal/transportationrates/ 
All combustion fuel-powered generator marginal costs can be estimated using 
engineering estimates from the literature, though some will not include fuel transport costs 
and O&M costs differ by technology.31  Additionally efficiencies of some technologies 
change over time and this is also accounted for using plant age and published technology-
specific efficiency depreciation rates.   O&M cost estimates are reported in various 
generator studies and by the EIA (see references in Table 1A), and are assumed here by 
plant type based on the age and generation technology utilized.  Transmission costs can 
also be assumed by identifying plants that are distant from major electricity markets and 
the reported transmission tariffs charged in 2008 TO 2010.  In the RMA region modeled 
here, transmission networks use “postage stamp” pricing in which a flat fee is charged per 
unit of power delivered, regardless of the distance the delivery requires.  Such information 
is available on WAPA an NTTG websites.32 
  
                                                          
31
 Gas power-plants were assumed to have fuel delivered by pipeline.  Local natural gas prices as reported by the 
EIA in the RMPA region were used to define the gas prices over the 2007-2009 period.  No freight cost was 
assumed between these prices and the delivered price as fuel delivery system costs were assumed to be sunk or 
fixed and not included in the price of fuel delivered.   
32
 Such tariffs are not distance dependent.  The rate was $3.75/MWh on both networks in 2008.   
Table 1A:  Assumptions used to Model Generation Marginal Costs 
Fuel Technology Assumed Efficiency Fuel cost Freight rate 
(ton-mile) 
O&M Variable 
Cost/MWh 
Bituminous 
Coal 
Steam turbine 
sub-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 28% 
1970-1989: 30% 
Post-1989: 30% 
$42/short 
ton 
$0.0655 
Uinta Basin 
 
$4.25 rising at 
1.5% per year  
 Steam turbine 
super-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 31.5% 
1970-1989: 35% 
Post-1989: 31.5% 
   
Sub-
bituminous 
Coal  
Steam turbine 
sub-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 28% 
1970-1989: 30% 
Post-1989: 30% 
$15/short 
ton 
$0.0655 
Uinta Basin 
$0.0221 PRB 
coal 
$4.25 rising at 
1.5% per year 
 Steam turbine 
super-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 28% 
1970-1989: 30% 
Post-1989: 30% 
   
Natural Gas Combined-cycle 1980-1999: 40.8% 
Post-1999: 47.5% 
falling at 0.2% per year 
$4.97/mcf 
(WY & SD) 
$4.91/mcf 
(CO) 
N.A. $4.42 
$4.28 with 
duct-firing 
 Gas turbine Pre-1997: 30.5% 
1997-2005: 32.1% 
Post-2005: 39.9% 
falling at 0.05% per 
year 
 N.A. $25.72 
Small (25 MW 
or less) 
$26.10 
 Internal 
combustion 
(Wartsila 
engine) 
38% falling at 0.05% 
per year 
 N.A. $15 
 Internal 
combustion 
35% falling at 0.05% 
per year 
 N.A. 0.0233*MW 
output - 0.1209  
 Steam Turbine 30.3%   N.A. $4.25 rising at 
1.5% per year 
Renewable Gas Internal 
combustion 
35% falling at 0.05% 
per year 
$2/mcf N.A. 0.0233*MW 
output - 0.1209 
 Gas Turbine 30.5%   $26.10 
Petroleum 
(diesel fuel) 
Internal 
combustion  
33.3% falling at 0.2% 
per year 
$2.25/gal N.A. 0.0233*MW 
output - 0.1209 
 Gas turbine 25.6%  N.A. $26.10 
Hydro (Water) Simple turbine N.A. N.A. N.A. $3.11 
 Pumped storage    $13.47 
Wind 1.5 MW Turbine N.A. N.A. N.A. $3.10  
Solar  Photo-voltaic N.A. N.A. N.A. $0.80 
Sources: Nyberg (2011), Nichols et al (2008), Beer (2006), CPUC (2007), EPA (2010), Hassler (2009), 
Brooks (2000), Ragland and Stenzel (2000), NWPP (2002), Simon et al. (2007), Klein and Rednam (2007), 
Kaplan (2008), EPRI (2011), Wärtsilä Corp. (2005).     
Table 2A: Energy Conversion Equivalents Used:   
 1MWh = 3,412,141.63 btu 
 1 short-ton (2000 lbs) bituminous coal =  23,400,000 btu 
 1 short-ton (2000 lbs) sub-bituminous coal =  17,600,000 btu 
 1 mcf (one thousand cubic feet) natural gas = 1,020,000 btu 
 1 mcf (one thousand cubic feet) methane or land-fill gas = 500,000 btu 
 1 US gallon diesel fuel = 129,500 btu 
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